Salt Lake City v. Paul N. Christensen : Brief of Appellant by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
2006
Salt Lake City v. Paul N. Christensen : Brief of
Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Mark Shurtleff; Attorney General; attorneys for appellee.
Jennifer K. Gowans; Fillmore, Spencer; attorneys for appellant.
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Salt Lake City v. Christensen, No. 20060006 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2006).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/6223
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
PAUL N. CHRISTENSEN, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
CaseNo.20060006-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
APPEAL FROM CONVICTION, JUDGMENT, SENTENCE, AND ORDER FOR 
COMMITMENT, IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, THE HONORABLE ROBIN W. 
REESE. APPELLANT IS CURRENTLY INCARCERATED ON THIS MATTER. 
Mark L.Shurtleff (4666) 
Utah Attorney General 
Appeals Division 
160 East 300 South 
6th Floor 
P.O. Box 140854 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854 
Jennifer K. Gowans 
Fillmore Spencer, LLC 
Jamestown Square 
3301 North University Avenue 
Provo, Utah 84604 
Attorneys for State of Utah Attorneys for Paul N. Christensen 
ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
PAUL N. CHRISTENSEN, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 20060006-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
APPEAL FROM CONVICTION, JUDGMENT, SENTENCE, AND ORDER FOR 
COMMITMENT, IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, THE HONORABLE ROBIN W. 
REESE. APPELLANT IS CURRENTLY INCARCERATED ON THIS MATTER. 
Mark L.Shurtleff (4666) 
Utah Attorney General 
Appeals Division 
160 East 300 South 
6th Floor 
P.O. Box 140854 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854 
Jennifer K. Gowans 
Fillmore Spencer, LLC 
Jamestown Square 
3301 North University Avenue 
Provo, Utah 84604 
Attorneys for State of Utah Attorneys for Paul N. Christensen 
ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
JURISDICTION 1 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 1 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 3 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 4 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 11 
ARGUMENT 12 
I. THE TRIAL COURT'S RULING THAT VU ACTED WITHIN THE 
SCOPE OF HIS AUTHORITY AS A PEACE OFFICER LACKED 
EVIDENTIARY SUPPORT AND WAS INCORRECT 12 
A. Rules of statutory construction establish that Vu was not 
acting within the scope of his authority as a peace officer 12 
B. Neither the facts nor the law support the trial court's 
conclusion that Vu was acting within the scope of his authority 
as a peace officer 15 
II. THE CITY'S STATEMENT THAT CHRISTENSEN'S MENTAL 
STATE WAS NO DEFENSE TO THE CHARGES WAS 
PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT, AND THE TRIAL COURT'S 
FAILURE TO CORRECT IT WAS PLAIN ERROR 20 
A. Prosecutorial misconduct 20 
B. Plain error 27 
i 
III. CHRISTENSEN'S COUNSEL RENDERED INEFFECTIVE 
ASSISTANCE 28 
A. Failure to raise mental illness defense 30 
B. Failure to object to prosecutor's misstatement of law 32 
CONCLUSION 32 
ii 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Cases 
Alvarado v. City of Dodge City, 708 P.2d 174 (Kan. 1985) 14,20 
Am. ForkCityv. PenaFlores, 2002 UT 131 19 
Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78 (1935) 23 
Blackner v. State, 2002 UT 44,48 P.3d 949 13 
Brooks v. State, 706 P.2d 664 (Wyo. 1985) 22-3 
Brown v. Sternes, 304 F.3d 677 (7th Cir. 2002) 30 
Christiansen v. Harris, 163 P.2d 314 (Utah 1945) 24 
Darden v. Wainwright, All U.S. 168 (1986) 24 
Dry v. City ofDurant, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 33330 (10th Cir.) (Unpublished) 19 
Gillmor v. Salt Lake City, 32 Utah 180 (Utah 1907) 16 
Harvard Crimson, Inc. v. President & Fellows of Harvard College, 445 Mass. 745 
(Mass. 2006) 20 
Jackson v. Mateus, 2003 UT 18 13 
Kylesv. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419 (1994) 29 
Panico v. United States, 375 U.S. 29 (1963) 22 
Parsons v. Barnes, 871 P.2d 516 (Utah), cert, denied, 513 U.S. 966 (1994) 28 
Petty v. Borg, 106 Utah 524 (Utah 1944) 16 
Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 111, 89 L. Ed. 1495, 65 S. Ct. 1031 (1945)16, 18-19 
iii 
State v. Alonzo, 932 P.2d 606 (Utah App. 1997) 19 
State v. Anderson, 612 P.2d 778 (Utah 1980) 24 
State v. Carter, 707 P.2d 656 (Utah 1985) 23 
State v. Classon, 935 P.2d 524 (Utah App. 1997) 3 
State v. Cosy, 873 P.2d 1117 (Utah App. 1994) 29 
State v. DePlonty, 749 P.2d621 (Utah 1987) 23 
State v. Eaton, 569 P.2d 1114 (Utah 1977) 26 
State v. Gallegos, 967 P.2d 973 (Utah 1998) 29 
State v. Gardiner, 814 P.2d 568 (Utah 1991) 2, 15-16 
State v. Hallett, 856 P.2d 1060 (Utah 1993) 31 
State v. Hamilton, 2003 UT 32 19 
State v. Hay, 859 P.2d 1 (Utah 1993) 23, 26 
State v. Jarrell, 608 P.2d 218 (Utah 1980) 23 
State v. Kell, 2002 UT 19 2 
State v. King, 2006 UT 3 27 
State v. Longshaw, 961 P.2d 925 (Utah App. 1998) 3, 25 
State v. Lovell, 758 P.2d 909 (Utah 1988) 29 
State v. Merrill, 2005 UT 34 2 
State v. M>a//, 2004 UT App 441 25 
State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774 (Utah 1991) 24 
iv 
State v. Saunders, 1999 UT 59, 992 P.2d 951 24 
State v. Sessions, 645 P.2d 643 (Utah 1982) 31 
State v. Smith, 65 P.3d 648 (Utah App. 2003) 29 
State v. Snyder, 860 P.2d 351 (Utah App. 1993) 29 
State v. Stevenson, 884 P.2d 1287 )Utah App. 1994) 25 
State v. Tarafa, 720 P.2d 1368 (Utah 1986) 26 
State v. Trane, 2002 UT 97 19 
State v. Troy, 688 P.2d 483 (Utah 1984) 25-6 
State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116 (Utah 1989) 31 
State v. Wallace, 2002 UT App 295 19 
Strickland\. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) 29-30, 32 
United States v. Dombrowsky, 111 Fed. Appx. 716 (5th Cir. 2004) 19-20 
United States v. Heliczer, 373 F.2d 241 (2d Cir. 1967) 15-16 
United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940) 25 
Wagner v. Utah Dept. of Human Servs., 122 P.3d 599 (Utah 2005) 13 
Constitutional Provisions 
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION, Sixth Amendment 32 
UTAH CONSTITUTION, Article I, §7 24 
UTAH CONSTITUTION, Article I, §12 24 
v 
Utah Code Annotated 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-305 21, 23, 30, 31 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-102.4 1-2, 12-13 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-9-102 1 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-1-6 24 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) 1 
vi 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH,1 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
PAUL N. CHRISTENSEN, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 20060006-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION 
Appellant, PAUL N. CHRISTENSEN ("Christensen"), appeals from the 
November 30,2005 Sentence, Judgment, and Order for Commitment (Rl33-35), and his 
conviction of Assault on a Peace Officer, a class A misdemeanor (Utah Code Ann. §76-5-
102.4), and Disorderly Conduct, a class C misdemeanor (Utah Code Ann. §76-9-102). 
Since this is a criminal case not involving a first degree felony, this Court has appellate 
jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(e). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
ISSUE 1: Did the trial court err when it concluded that an individual was 
"acting within the scope of his authority as a peace officer" (Utah Code Ann. §76-5-
1
 Although the plaintiff was originally Salt Lake City, and therefore, it appears the 
caption is incorrect, all of the trial transcripts and appellate documents, including the 
Notice of Appeal, list the State of Utah as the plaintiff. 
102.4(1)), when he was acting within the scope of his private employment as a security 
guard? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: A district court's interpretation of a statute is a 
question of law reviewed for correctness, and this Court affords no deference to the 
district court's legal conclusions. State v. Merrill, 2005 UT 34, fl2. "In cases involving 
mixed questions of fact and law where the judge makes a determination on contested 
facts, [this court] view[s] the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court's 
ruling and reversefs] only if the necessary factual findings implicit in the court's ruling 
lack sufficient evidentiary support. In reviewing the application of the law to those facts 
and findings, [this court applies] a correctness standard and reverse[s] if the legal 
standard is not satisfied." State v. Gardiner, 814 P.2d 568, 574-575 (Utah 1991) 
(citations omitted). This issue was preserved when Christensen moved for directed 
verdict during trial (Rl55:132-38). 
ISSUE 2: Did the State commit prosecutorial misconduct when it instructed the 
jury that the defendant's hallucinating and inability to remember certain details about the 
subject events was no defense to the crimes? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: A trial court's allowance of a prosecutor's 
improper statements that are not objected to at trial is reviewed for plain error. State v. 
Kell, 2002 UT 19, [^40. "In determining whether a given statement constitutes 
prosecutorial misconduct, the statement must be viewed in light of the totality of the 
2 
evidence presented at trial." State v. Longshaw, 961 P.2d 925, 927 (Utah App. 1998). 
ISSUE 3: Did Christensen's trial counsel render ineffective assistance that 
prejudiced Christensen when they failed (1) to raise a mental illness defense on the 
ground that Christensen lacked the requisite intent, and (2) to object to the prosecutor's 
statements to the jury that the defendant's mental state was no defense to the crimes? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: Whether trial counsel rendered ineffective 
assistance is a mixed question of law and fact. An appellate court defers to any findings 
from the trial court but reviews any legal conclusions for correctness. State v. Class on, 
935 P.2d 524 (Utah App. 1997). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Christensen was charged by information filed August 1, 2003, with one count of 
assault against a health care provider, one count of assault against a peace officer, and one 
count of disorderly conduct, two class A misdemeanors and one class C misdemeanor, 
respectively (R3-9). A jury trial was conducted on November 30, 2005, after which the 
jury convicted Christensen of assault against a peace officer and disorderly conduct, but 
acquitted him of assaulting a health care worker (R133-35; 155:199-200). 
During the trial and after the State rested, Christensen moved for directed verdict 
on the assault charges, which the trial court denied (R155:132-38). Christensen timely 
filed his Notice of Appeal on December 26, 2005 (R138-45). 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On July 23, 2003, at approximately 2:00 a.m., Christensen was taken to the 
emergency room ("ER") of the Salt Lake L.D.S. Hospital by his mother (Rl 55:55, 80). 
During a domestic dispute shortly before his arrival, Christensen's brother had severed 
3/4 of an inch of Christensen's left pinky finger with an exacto knife and drenched him 
with mace (Rl55:55, 115, 157). When Christensen arrived at the ER, his eyes were 
swollen from the mace (R155:144, 158), his finger was dripping blood (R155:108), and 
his body and clothing were covered with blood (R155:55, 57, 65, 96, 108). 
Christensen was mentally "out of it" and likely in a state of shock (R155:106, 
145, 147).2 It was obvious to hospital staff that this was an emergency situation and that 
Christensen needed to see a doctor to address his injury (Rl 55:65-6). He also appeared to 
hospital medical staff to be psychotic and hallucinating (R155:l 17-18). 
Thomas Vu was working part-time for IHC (Rl55:62-3, 86), "doing security 
protection for the staff and the patients" (R155:55, 70). IHC is a private corporation 
(Rl 55:86). Vu was paid by IHC, and his responsibilities in the scope of that employment 
required him to ask people coming into the ER why they were there and if they need help 
(Rl55:63, 65, 67, 76, 86). IHC also required Vu to provide security and to have visitors 
sign a visiting log (Rl 55:67, 76, 80). Vu also testified that as part of his job with IHC, he 
2Medical shock was defined during trial as "decreased oxygen to the brain as 
pumped by the blood a state of oxygen deprivation." (Rl 55:117). 
4 
calmed patients down before allowing them to see hospital staff (Rl 55:70). 
Vu also worked for the Salt Lake City Police Department on the SWAT team 
and on patrol (Rl55:54). Vu testified he was wearing his police uniform when 
Christensen came to the ER, and that police officers are authorized to act in their law 
enforcement capacities when they are working part-time for private employers (Rl 55:55, 
75). However, Vu's specific responsibilities for IHC, for which he was paid by IHC, 
were outside the scope of his employment as a police officer (Rl 55:67). Nonetheless, Vu 
testified, he was always a police officer and authorized to act in that capacity at all times 
(R155:75). 
Vu had previously heard on the radio the dispatch report of a domestic violence 
incident where a man had his finger cut off and had been sprayed with mace (Rl 55:55). 
Vu reported this information to nurse Alan Rigdon, and indicated that the patient may be 
coming to the ER (Rl55:94). Vu was sitting in his station next to the registration clerk, 
Berthana Drossos, when Christensen arrived (Rl 55:66, 78, 80). 
Christensen was loud and yelling at his mother (Rl 55:55, 80) and demanded to 
be seen by a doctor (Rl 55:95-96). Christensen's mother testified that he was in shock 
and did not know what he was saying (Rl55:147). Drossos testified that after 
Christensen and his mother sat down in the waiting area and she approached them with a 
consent form and to ask his name, Christensen demanded to see a doctor and was "loud 
and belligerent and rude and obnoxious" (R155:81). After Drossos explained the 
5 
necessary procedure, Christensen then gave Drossos his name and birthdate and she 
returned to her desk to enter the information into her computer (R155:81-2, 87). 
Vu approached Christensen and inquired if he needed to be seen, to which 
Christensen responded, "I need to see a doctor, not a f***ing cop" (Rl55:57, 83). Vu 
testified that he told Christensen he needed to calm down before Vu could let the doctors 
see him, to which Christensen again responded he needed to see a doctor and not a 
«f***ing Cop" (R155:57).3 Vu told Christensen that he needed to "clean up [his] 
language" before he could see a doctor (Rl55:82). 
During the next approximately 15-20 minutes (Rl55:70, 98), Christensen 
"continued to yell out. . . cussing and demanding to be seen" (Rl55:59). Officer Vu 
responded to these outbursts by telling Christensen he needed to calm down before his 
injury would be evaluated, "for the safety of the staff members" (R155:59). Vu testified 
that Christensen responded, "F*** you, you f***ing ***hole" (R155:59). Vu testified 
that due to Christensen's size and behavior, and that he was a suspect in a domestic 
violence incident, he requested back-up (Rl55:58, 68). 
Vu reported the situation to the charge nurse, Alan Rigdon (R155:59).4 Rigdon 
testified that Christensen's behavior was aggressive, elevated, and threatening (Rl 55:96-
3Vu also testified that Christensen told him he was going to kill his brother, the 
other party in the domestic violence incident (Rl 55:58). 
4Rigdon testified that he approached Christensen immediately after Christensen 
arrived at the ER and while Christensen was going through the registration process 
(R155:95). 
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7); and that he threatened he could beat Rigdon up (R155:108). Christensen would then 
calm down and listen to Rigdon, but then would get upset and demand to see a doctor 
(R155:97). However, Rigdon testified that the ER doctor refused to see Christensen until 
he calmed down (Rl55:98). Rigdon described Christensen's behavior as "psychosis", 
which condition standing alone warranted medical care (Rl 55:109-10). 
While Rigdon tried to calm Christensen, Vu "grabbed [Christensen] by his left 
arm to take him under control", not to arrest him or otherwise enforce the law, but 
"because he needed to be seen . . . for his hand" (Rl55:60, 77, 99). After Vu grabbed 
Christensen's injured arm, Vu and Rigdon both testified that Christensen tried 
unsuccessfully to strike Vu with his uninjured right hand (R155:61, 99). Vu and Rigdon 
then took Christensen to the ground to take him under control (R155:61).5 
In the scuffle, Christensen's elderly mother, who was wearing leg braces, was 
also knocked out of her chair onto the ground, breaking bones in her vertebrae 
(Rl55:127-28; 146-50). She also testified that after Christensen was knocked to the 
ground, one of the officers punched him several times in the kidneys until she yelled at 
5Christensen's mother testified that three uniformed officers took Christensen to 
the ground while he passively stood there (R155:146). Drossos' account was also 
significantly different from Vu's. She testified for the City that Christensen "took a hit" 
from Vu, and then "Vu knocked [Christensen] to the floor" (R155:85). Then, Rigdon 
came out and Christensen kept fighting while both Vu and Rigdon tried to subdue him 
(Rl55:85). Drossos testified that she may not have seen the entire incident because she 
was holding closed the doors leading back to the treatment area to prevent patients from 
coming out to see what was going on (R155:90-91). 
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him to stop (R155:148, 154). Christensen's mother testified that she never saw 
Christensen strike or otherwise assault anyone (R155:150). 
During the 15 minutes prior to Vu grabbing the same arm as Christensen's 
injury, Vu testified that Christensen had exhibited no threatening behavior toward Vu 
(R155:71-3). Christensen was only swearing and took what Vu described as a "defensive 
stand" and clenching his fists (Rl55:71). Rigdon testified that Christensen became 
aggressive before Vu grabbed him and threatened to "kick [their] asses'1 (Rl 55:99). 
Although Christensen generally remembered the incident including some details, 
he was very upset about the prospect of losing his finger6 and there were many details he 
did not remember (Rl55:158-59, 164). He was "pretty crazy" and "into [his] own 
situation" (Rl55:159-60). Other than Vu, he did not remember who else was involved in 
knocking him to the ground, but knew there were 3-4 people involved (Rl55:160). He 
also remembered being hit, kicked, having his legs and hands tied, then being carried 
outside and laid on the cement (R155:162). He remembered being surrounded by SWAT 
team members while outside and them laughing at him (R155:162). 
Once Christensen was on the ground, Christensen continued trying to kick and 
hit Vu and Rigdon, so Vu kicked him a couple of times (R155.61, 73, 84, 100, 114). Vu 
testified that two other staff members arrived and it took all four of them to subdue 
Christensen (Rl 55:61). Trisha Gurney who was one of the two other staff members 
6Christensen testified that he had played the guitar for 35 years (Rl55:158-59). 
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testified that Christensen seemed angry and very agitated (Rl 55:124). Christensen was 
then placed in handcuffs while he continued to yell obscenities (R155:61-2, 114). Vif s 
only intent was to take Christensen under control so he could receive treatment for his 
injury (Rl55:74). 
After he was handcuffed, Vu testified that Christensen yelled that he "holds the 
priesthood power and that God was going to get all [of the individuals who held him 
down] within the week" (Rl 55:62). Nurse Rigdon, who had 18 years of experience 
working at L.D.S. Hospital (Rl55:92), testified that Christensen continued to be "wild 
and crazy in his thoughts and his verbal actions" (Rl 55:100), that Christensen seemed to 
be hallucinating (Rl55:117-18), and that persons in shock may react with anger and not 
perceive what is going on (R155:106). Medic Trisha Gurney testified that persons w ho 
are hallucinating are "not thinking correct"(R155:129). 
Christensen was then taken outside and sat on the ground for 20 minutes to at 
least an hour (R155:85,101, 114, 155, 163). After sitting outside the ER for a period of 
time, Christensen eventually calmed down, was cooperative, and consented to be given a 
sedative (R155:102). When asked on direct examination if the time-frame that elapsed 
before Christensen was sedated was appropriate, Rigdon testified, "[I]t was, because his 
. . behavior had . . . de-escalated, he had become calmer, more rational in that time frame; 
but still... ranting and raving, but not as . . . threatening." (R155:l 19) (emphasis added). 
Christensen9s injury was not treated by a doctor until 4:45 a.m., almost three 
9 
hours after he arrived at the ER (Rl55:155). 
After the City rested, Christiansen's counsel moved for directed verdict on the 
assault charges on the ground that the State had failed to prove its case (Rl 55:132). 
Relative to the charge of assault against a peace officer, the defense argued that Vu was 
not acting within the scope of his authority as required by the controlling statute because 
he was employed by IHC and acting within the scope of that employment when the 
incident occurred (R155:133). The trial court denied the motion, concluding that the jury 
could find that Vu was acting within the scope of his authority as a peace officer because 
he was wearing his uniform and was performing "peace officer functions" (R155:138). 
During the City's rebuttal closing arguments, the prosecutor informed the jury 
that Christensen's inability to remember the events and evidence that he was hallucinating 
was no defense to the charges (R155:197). The jury convicted Christensen on Counts II 
and III, assault on a peace officer, a class A misdemeanor, and disorderly conduct, a class 
C misdemeanor (Rl 55:199-200). Christensen was acquitted of the charge of assault on a 
health care provider (Rl 55:199). 
After the verdict, Christensen requested immediate sentencing due to the fact 
that he had been in custody on the case for over 130 days, and was apparently hoping that 
he would not serve much additional time since he did not have a significant criminal 
history (R155:201-03). However, the trial court informed Christensen that if he waived 
the statutory time for sentencing and a presentence report, there was a "pretty good 
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chance" the maximum sentence would be imposed (Rl 55:202). Against the advice of his 
counsel, Christensen informed the trial court of his desire for immediate sentencing 
(R155.-202). 
During sentencing, the trial court noted: 
[W]ith respect to possible needs for mental health counseling, I - when I hear 
the evidence in this case, it suggests to me that on this evening in question, there 
was something wrong, whether it was - you were intoxicated or whether you 
were going through some bout of mental illness, I don't know. 
(Rl55:205). The trial court then sentenced Christensen to 364 days on the class A and 90 
days on the class C, to run concurrent with each other and with credit for time served 
(Rl 55:205). Christensen is still incarcerated on this case. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Point I: The trial court's ruling that Vu was acting within the scope of his 
authority as a peace officer while he was employed by a private employer as a security 
guard is not supported by the evidence and is incorrect. Private employment is 
considered a "personal frolic" under the relevant case law. Moreover, expanding the 
meaning of the statute to include private employments will expand governments' civil 
liability for torts committed within the scope of those employments. 
Point II; The prosecutor's instruction to the jury during closing arguments that 
evidence that Christensen was hallucinating was no defense to the charges was incorrect 
as a matter of law and constituted prosecutorial misconduct. Because the trial court did 
not correct this misstatement and Christensen's counsel did not object, and because no 
11 
other instruction was given relative to the impact of a mental illness on a defendant's 
ability to form intent, the jury was improperly influenced by the statement and 
Christensen was prejudiced thereby. Further, the trial court's failure to correct the 
prosecutor's incorrect statement of the law constituted plain error. 
Point III: Christensen's trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing 
to raise a mental illness defense and by failing to object to the prosecutor's misstatement 
of the law that Christensen's hallucinating at the time of the incident was no defense. 
There is no strategic basis for failing to raise a complete defense to the charges, and had 
counsel done so, there is more than a reasonable probability of a more favorable outcome 
in light of the ample evidence that Christensen lacked the requisite mental state. 
Also, trial counsels' failure to object to the prosecutor's statement that mental 
state is no defense demonstrated a failure to investigate the law, which failure constitutes 
objectively deficient performance. This failure prejudiced Christensen because the jury 
was likely influenced by the prosecutor's statement, and had it been correct, there is more 
than a reasonable probability that Christensen would have been acquitted of all charges. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT'S RULING THAT VU ACTED WITHIN THE 
SCOPE OF HIS AUTHORITY AS A PEACE OFFICER LACKED 
EVIDENTIARY SUPPORT AND WAS INCORRECT. 
A. Rules of statutory construction establish that Vu was not acting 
within the scope of his authority as a peace officer. 
Utah Code Ann. §76-5-102.4 provides in pertinent part: 
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Any person who assaults a peace officer, with knowledge that he is a peace 
officer, and when the peace officer is acting within the scope of his authority as 
a peace officer, is guilty of a class A misdemeanor. 
The statutory language at issue here is "acting within the scope of his authority." 
Christensen contends that Vu was not acting within the scope of his authority as a peace 
officer when he was employed as a private security guard by IHC, nor does the evidence 
support a finding that he was. 
"In interpreting any statute, rules of statutory construction require the court to 
'first look to the statute's plain language, and give effect to the plain language unless the 
language is ambiguous.9" Wagner v. Utah Dept of Human Servs., 122 P.3d 599, 602 
(Utah 2005) (quoting Blackner v. State, 2002 UT 44, If 12, 48 P.3d 949. A statute "should 
be applied according to its literal wording, unless such a reading is unreasonably 
confused, inoperable, or in blatant contravention of the express purpose of the statute." 
Jackson v. Mateus, 2003 UT 18, f21 (citations and quotations omitted). "[Statutory 
enactments are to be so construed as to render all parts thereof relevant and meaningful, 
and interpretations are to be avoided which render some part of a provision nonsensical or 
absurd." Id. (citations and quotations omitted). 
The plain language of the statute at issue requires an individual to be acting 
within the scope of his authority as a peace officer before the statute can apply. Giving 
effect to the literal meaning of that language, an individual is not acting within the scope 
of his authority as a peace officer when he is employed by a private employer and acting 
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within the scope of his private employment, i.e., fulfilling his duties to that private 
employer, as Vu was in this case. Simply wearing a peace officer uniform does not mean 
a person is acting within the scope of her authority as a peace officer. Rather, he or she 
must be performing peace officer duties, not private security guard duties. 
In this case, Vu was working as a private security guard for IHC within the 
scope of that employment when the incident occurred (Rl 55:55, 60, 62-3, 65, 67, 70, 76-
7, 86, 99). Giving full effect to the plain and unambiguous statutory language, a private 
security guard fulfilling his employment obligations to his private employer is not acting 
within the scope of his authority as a peace officer; rather, he is acting within the scope of 
his employment as a private security guard. 
Indeed, Christensen was unable to find any case where a court held that an 
officer moonlighting as a private security guard acted within the scope of his authority as 
a peace officer, except for one instance in a civil rights case where there was first a clear 
showing of police authority and then an arrest. Alvarado v. City of Dodge City, 708 P.2d 
174 (Kan. 1985) (holding that an off-duty police officer working as a private security 
guard acted under color of state law when he displayed his badge and arrested a suspected 
shoplifter). It is noteworthy that in Alvarado, the proverbial shoe was on the other foot as 
the municipality vigorously argued that the officer was not acting within the scope of his 
authority, and thus not acting under color of state law. Therefore, in light of the potential 
ramifications on civil rights cases, it appears it is not in the State's best interest to argue 
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that Vu was acting within the scope of his authority as a peace officer, or for this Court to 
set precedent so finding. 
Accordingly, and under a literal reading of the unambiguous terms of the 
controlling statute, Vu was not acting within the scope of his authority as a peace officer, 
and Christensen's conviction for Count II should be vacated. 
B. Neither the facts nor the law support the trial court's conclusion that 
Vu was acting within the scope of his authority as a peace officer. 
In addition to rules of statutory construction, the Utah Supreme Court has treated 
this issue of scope of authority as a mixed question of fact and law, where the evidence is 
considered in the light most favorable to the trial court's ruling and "reverse[d] only if the 
necessary factual findings implicit in the court's ruling lack sufficient evidentiary support. 
In reviewing the application of the law to those facts and findings, [this court applies] a 
correctness standard and reverse[s] if the legal standard is not satisfied. State v. 
Gardiner, 814 P.2d at 574-75. 
Also, Christensen had no burden of proof in the district court. Rather, it was the 
City's initial burden to show that Vu was acting within the scope of his authority as a 
peace officer when he sought to restrain Christensen so Christensen could, as Vu himself 
testified, receive medical treatment for his hand (Rl55:60, 70, 99). Id. at 574. 
The Gardiner court further instructed: 
In interpreting the language "scope of authority," we find illustrative the Second 
Circuit's decision in United States v. Heliczer, 373 F.2d 241, 245 (2d Cir. 1967). 
There, it stated that the test is whether an officer is doing what he or she was 
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employed to do or is "engaging in a personal frolic of his [or her] own." Id. 
Id. Therefore, the trial court in this case applied the wrong legal standard when it found 
that Vu was acting within the scope of his authority as a peace officer because he was 
wearing his uniform when the incident occurred and because Vu had a duty "whether . . . 
he's on shift or not as a peace officer to perform peace officer functions" (R155:138). 
However, the trial court did not find that Vu was doing what he was employed to do as a 
peace officer when the incident occurred. Hence, the court applied the wrong standard. 
Moreover, under the trial court's broad interpretation of the statute, a peace 
officer will always be construed as acting within the scope of his authority, and 
consequently, acting under color of state law.7 See, Screws v. United States, infra. 
Notwithstanding the fact that the trial court applied the wrong standard, the 
evidence still does not support the court's ruling, nor did the City meet its burden to prove 
7As previously alluded to, there are compelling public policy reasons why 
government entities would be adamantly opposed to having an individual who is 
moonlighting for a private employer construed as acting within the scope of his authority 
as a peace officer. Such a broad construction will increase governments' civil liabilities 
for torts committed by officers. See, Petty v. Borg, 106 Utah 524 (Utah 1944) ("The 
United States does not undertake to guarantee the fidelity of any of its officers or agents 
in its employ and is not bound or estopped by acts of such officers or agents not within 
scope of their authority"); Gillmor v. Salt Lake City, 32 Utah 180 (Utah 1907) ("A 
municipal corporation is liable for the acts of its officers, servants and agents, done within 
the scope of their authority, though neither expressly authorized in advance nor 
subsequently ratified by it, or as the rule has been otherwise expressed, a city is liable for 
the acts of its representatives done bona fide in pursuance of a general authority to act for 
the city on the subject to which they relate.") (citation omitted). The legislature could not 
have anticipated or intended the increased civil liability that will be imposed against 
government entities under the trial court's broad reading of the statute at issue. 
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that Vu was acting within the scope of his peace officer authority. 
Construing the evidence in a light most favorable to the trial court's ruling, Vu 
was a Salt Lake City police officer (Rl55:54) working part-time as a security guard for 
L.D.S. Hospital when the incident occurred (Rl55:62-3, 86). Vu testified that he was 
listening to dispatch on the radio and wearing his police uniform, and that he reported to 
nurse Alan Rigdon that an individual involved in a domestic dispute might be coming to 
the ER (Rl 55:55, 94). He further testified that the nature of his law enforcement job was 
such that he was always acting in his capacity as a peace officer, even when he was 
working for a private employer (Rl55:55, 75). Sometime after Christensen arrived at the 
ER, Vu testified that he called for back-up (Rl55:58, 68). Vu also temporarily placed 
Christensen in handcuffs (Rl 55:61-2). 
On the other hand, Vu was fulfilling his specific duties as a security guard that 
were distinct from his peace officer duties (Rl55:55, 63, 65, 67, 70, 76, 86). Moreover, 
he was paid by IHC, a private employer, for executing those duties (Rl 55:55, 63, 65, 67, 
70, 76, 86). In addition to clerical duties such as helping visitors sign in, as a security 
guard employed by IHC, Vu had a duty to help calm people before they were seen by 
hospital staff (Rl 55:70). When Christensen arrived at the ER, Vu reported to hospital 
staff about Christensen's condition and behavior (R155:58, 68). Notably, Vu's own 
stated purpose in restraining Christensen was not to arrest him or to enforce the law, but 
to "take [Christensen] under control" . . . "because he needed to be seen . . . for his hand" 
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(R155:60,77,99). 
Whether or not Vu might perform some similar functions as a peace officer, the 
evidence is clear that he was performing the foregoing particular tasks within the scope of 
his employment with IHC. 
Thus, the City never met its initial burden because it never demonstrated that Vu 
was doing what he was employed to do as a peace officer when the incident occurred. 
Rather, the evidence unequivocally showed that Vu was doing what he was privately 
employed by IHC - not by Salt Lake City - to do. 
Therefore, even construing all of the foregoing evidence in a light most 
favorable to the trial court's ruling, it still compels the conclusion that Vu was acting in 
his capacity as a security guard for IHC and not within the scope of his authority as a 
peace officer when the incident occurred. Vu did not arrest anyone or enforce the law. By 
his own testimony, Vu acted to facilitate Christensen's treatment (Rl 55:60, 77, 99). 
Based on all of these facts, the evidence does not support the trial court's finding that Vu 
was acting within the scope of his authority as a peace officer. 
Moreover, notwithstanding these facts, the law also does not support the trial 
court's conclusion. Private employment is universally construed by courts as a "personal 
frolic" that removes acts occurring therein from "under the color of state law" and the 
scope of peace officer authority.8 See, Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 111, 89 L. 
8Unlike this case, the interpretation of "scope of authority" has usually arisen in the 
context of on-duty officers who allegedly committed unlawful acts, such as unlawful 
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Ed. 1495, 65 S. Ct. 1031 (1945) ("It is well-settled that the acts of officers in the ambit of 
their personal pursuits are not under color of law."); Dry v. City ofDurant, 2000 U.S. 
App. LEXIS 33330 (10th Cir. 2000) (Unpublished) (same) (holding that uniformed police 
officers working as private security guards on an Indian reservation were not acting 
within the scope of their authority as peace officers); State v. Wallace, 2002 UT App 295 
(holding that 21-year veteran of sheriff s department who was on duty, in uniform, and 
was executing a valid search warrant to take a blood sample was acting within the scope 
of his authority as a peace officer); State v. Alonzo, 932 P.2d 606, 616 (Utah App. 1997) 
(explaining that a peace officer's actions are within the scope of his authority when they 
are "within the course of [his] duties"); see also, United States v. Dombrowsky, 111 Fed. 
Appx. 716, 718 (5th Cir. 2004) ("An officer is considered to be engaged in his official 
duties and thus protected by the statute, 18 U.S.C. §§ 111, if he is performing the 
functions for which he is employed, if he is acting in good faith and in the colorable 
performance of his duties, and if he is not on a frolic of his own") (citation and quotation 
search and seizure, while engaged in their law enforcement functions. See, e.g., State v. 
Hamilton, 2003 UT 22; Am. Fork City v. Pena-Flores, 2002 UT 131; State v. Tram, 2002 
UT 97. It has rarely arisen in the context of private employment, as here. 
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omitted).9 
Vu was employed by IHC, not Salt Lake City, to be a security guard. The 
evidence proves that he was acting within the scope of that employment and fulfilling his 
particular obligations to IHC in that role when the incident occurred. Moreover, Vu's 
part-time employment as a security guard for a private employer was a personal "frolic" 
outside the scope of his peace officer duties and authority, as a matter of law. 
Accordingly, Christensen's conviction for assault on a peace officer should be vacated. 
H. THE CITY'S STATEMENT THAT CHRISTENSEN'S MENTAL STATE 
WAS NO DEFENSE TO THE CHARGES WAS PROSECUTORIAL 
MISCONDUCT, AND THE TRIAL COURT'S FAILURE TO CORRECT 
IT WAS PLAIN ERROR. 
A. Prosecutorial misconduct 
During the City's rebuttal closing arguments, the prosecutor misinformed the 
jury that Christensen's inability to remember the events and other evidence of his mental 
state, including that he was hallucinating, was no defense to the charges (R155:197). 
9It is not Christensen's position that an officer must be on duty to be acting within 
the scope of his authority. An off-duty peace officer can act within the scope of his 
authority if he finds himself in an emergency situation where enforcement of the law is 
necessary. See, Alvarado v. City of Dodge City, supra (holding that an off-duty police 
officer working as a private security guard acted under color of state law when he 
displayed his badge and arrested a suspected shoplifter). However, if he is performing 
duties for a private employer, he is not acting within the scope of his authority as a peace 
officer. See, Harvard Crimson, Inc. v. President & Fellows of Harvard College, 445 
Mass. 745, 752 (Mass. 2006) ("[P]rivately employed security guards engage in functions 
that are different from those performed by ordinary police officers"). 
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This statement was incorrect as a matter of law. See, Utah Code Ann. §76-2-305.10 
There was persuasive evidence - even from the State's own witnesses - that 
Christensen was suffering from medical shock, psychosis or other mental illness, 
including hallucinations (R155:55, 57, 65, 96, 100, 106, 108-10, 117-19, 129, 145, 147, 
158-60,164), thereby negating his ability to form intent or to appreciate the wrongfulness 
of his conduct. Even the trial court believed that Christensen was suffering from a mental 
illness at the time of the incident based on the evidence (11155:205).'l 
Christensen arrived at the ER immediately after a significant portion of his left 
pinky finger had been completely severed and after he had been "drenched" with mace 
(Rl55:55, 115, 144, 157-58). He had already lost enough blood that it covered his body 
and clothing (Rl 55:55, 57, 65, 96, 108). His injury continued to bleed at a steady, if not 
life-threatening, rate (R155:108). He was likely in shock (R155:106, 145, 147). His 
irrational behavior was also indicative of psychosis (Rl 55:62, 100, 109-10, 117-19, 124) 
- which mental illness hospital staff recognized and would have treated him for 
notwithstanding his physical injury (Rl55:109-10, 129). 
10Utah Code Ann. §76-2-305(1) and (4) provide in pertinent part: "It is a defense to 
a prosecution under any statute or ordinance that the defendant, as a result of mental 
illness, lacked the mental state required as an element of the offense charged.... 'Mental 
illness' means a mental disease or defect that substantially impairs a person's mental, 
emotional, or behavioral functioning. A mental defect may be . . . the result of injury .. .'n 
uThe trial court also mentioned that perhaps Christensen was intoxicated, but there 
was no evidence of intoxication. In any event, the court recognized that there appeared to 
be something wrong with Christensen that affected his mental state. 
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Christensen, who was frantic to see a doctor (R155:57, 59, 83, 95-8, 159-60), 
was told repeatedly that he could not see a doctor until he calmed down (Rl 55:57, 59, 
82), likely increasing Christensen's anxiety and exacerbating the psychosis. Thomas Vu 
then "grabbed" the injured arm (R155:60, 77, 99) of a man the City's own witnesses 
testified was psychotic, hallucinating, and "not thinking correct" (R155:129), then had 
him charged with assault when the psychotic patient purportedly reacted (R155:61, 99). 
In light of these facts, one cannot help but wonder what Vu and hospital staff 
expected to happen when Christensen was grabbed by his injured arm. There is 
something fundamentally wrong with the fact that a person seeking medical help who was 
obviously suffering from shock, psychosis, hallucinations and a significant physical injury 
was charged with assault after he reacted to the same arm as his injury being grabbed, 
then knocked to the floor and savagely kicked and punched. 
Utah Code Ann. §76-2-305 expressly recognizes that a person suffering from 
mental illness may lack the mental state to form the requisite intent under any criminal 
statute or ordinance. The U.S. Supreme Court has also recognized that certain mental 
states may negate a defendant's criminal responsibility. Panico v. United States. 375 U.S. 
29, 30 (1963) (holding that defendant who was diagnosed with schizophrenia after being 
held in criminal contempt was entitled to a hearing to determine whether he had any 
criminal responsibility for his actions); see also, Brooks v. State, 706 P.2d 664, 667 (Wyo. 
1985) ("Mental illness or deficiency is an affirmative defense which relieves an accused 
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of responsibility for the crime he committed"). 
In Utah, an injury-induced or other mental illness is an affirmative defense 
"under any statute or ordinance" if the nature of it is such that the defendant "lacked the 
mental state required as an element of the offense charged." Utah Code Ann. §76-2-
305(1) and (4)(a). Thus, this statutory defense applies to both general intent crimes, such 
as assault and disorderly conduct, and specific intent crimes, such as assault on a peace 
officer or health care worker. If the evidence proves that a defendant suffered from a 
mental illness such that he "lacked the mental state required as an element of the offense 
charged" (Utah Code Ann. §76-2-305(l)(a)), it "establishes] that a defendant lacked the 
mens rea required by a particular crime." State v. De Plonty, 749 P.2d 621, 626 (Utah 
1987) (discussing both insanity and diminished capacity defenses). 
Therefore, the City prosecutor misstated the law and thereby misled the jury 
when she instructed them that Christensen's mental state, including hallucinations, was 
no defense to the charges. 
The prosecutor's duty "in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, 
but that justice shall be done." Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935). Utah law 
has long recognized that a criminal trial is ostensibly a search for the truth, rather than a 
mere contest between the defense and prosecution. See, e.g., State v. Hay, 859 P.2d 1, 7 
(Utah 1993); State v. Carter, 707 P.2d 656, 662 (Utah 1985); State v. Jarrell, 608 P.2d 
218, 224 (Utah 1980). 
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In State v. Saunders, 1999 UT 59, 992 P.2d 951, the court explained that the 
special role of the prosecutor does not call for overreaching, but requires constant 
vigilance for fairness. The court stated, 
"[P]rosecutors have duties that rise above those of privately employed 
attorneys. [They must]... eschew all improper tactics. ...[A prosecuting 
attorney] is the representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy, 
but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as 
compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, 
therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but 
that justice shall be done. As such, he is in a peculiar and very definite 
sense the servant of the law, the twofold aim of which is that guilt shall 
not escape or innocence suffer. He may prosecute with earnestness and 
vigor - indeed, he should do so. But, while he may strike hard blows, 
he is not at liberty to strike foul ones. It is as much his duty to refrain 
from improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful conviction as 
it is to use every legitimate means to bring about a just one." 
Id. at 961 (citations omitted). 
A defendant's right to due process of law is violated if a prosecutor's comments 
taint the fundamental fairness of the proceedings. See, e.g., Darden v. Wainwright, 477 
U.S. 168,181 (1986).12 Moreover, a claim for prosecutorial misconduct must be analyzed 
l2Article I §§ 7 and 12 of the Utah Constitution provide due process of law and the 
right to a fair trial, as does Utah Code Ann. § 77-1-6. Article I § 7, the due process 
provision, has been interpreted to require exclusion of unreliable evidence which is likely 
to be unduly impressive to jurors, see, State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774 (Utah 1991), and as 
requiring an inquiry into the merits of the case to be adjudicated, see generally 
Christiansen v. Harris, 163 P.2d 314, 317 (Utah 1945). Article I § 12 provides the 
general procedural and substantive rights of criminal defendants to insure the 
fundamental fairness of criminal proceedings. See, generally, State v. Anderson, 612 
P.2d 778 (Utah 1980). When a prosecutor's arguments draw the jurors' attention away 
from the merits of the case, such as occurred here, they call into question the reliability 
and fairness of the proceedings, and these provisions are implicated. 
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on its facts in a manner mindful of the defendant's constitutional rights to a fair trial. 
United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 240 (1940)("[A]ppeals to passion 
and prejudice may so poison the minds of the jurors even in a strong case that an accused 
may be deprived of a fair trial.... [EJach case necessarily turns on its own facts."). 
Christensen must demonstrate that the prosecutor's remarks in this case "(1) 
called to the jury's attention matters which they would not be justified in considering in 
reaching their verdict, and (2) under the circumstances, the jury was probably influenced 
by the remarks." State v. Noall, 2004 UT App. 441, ^2 (quoting State v. Stevenson, 884 
P.2d 1287, 1290 (Utah App. 1994); see also, State v. Troy, 688 P.2d 483, 486 (Utah 1984) 
(same). A prosecutor's improper remarks are viewed in light of the totality of the 
evidence presented. State v. Longshaw, 961 P.2d 925, 930 (Utah App. 1998) (finding no 
prejudice where the trial court corrected a prosecutor's misstatement of the law). 
Misstatements of the law are certainly improper, prejudicial, and violate Troy. 
Id. The Troy Court explained the prejudice analysis in the context of the totality of the 
evidence as follows: 
If proof of defendant's guilt is strong, the challenged conduct or remark will not 
be presumed prejudicial. Likewise, in a case with less compelling proof, this 
Court will more closely scrutinize the conduct. If the conclusion of the jurors is 
based on their weighing conflicting evidence or evidence susceptible of differing 
interpretations, there is a greater likelihood that they will be improperly 
influenced through remarks of counsel. Indeed, in such cases, the jurors may be 
searching for guidance in weighing and interpreting the evidence. They may be 
especially susceptible to influence, and a small degree of influence may be 
sufficient to affect the verdict. Counsel is obligated in such cases to avoid, as far 
as possible, any reference to those matters the jury is not justified in considering. 
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Id. at 486-87 (citation omitted). 
Once prosecutorial misconduct is established, it is the State's burden to show 
that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Tarafa, 720 P.2d 1368, 1373 and 
n.21 (Utah 1986). Further, all reasonable doubts are to be resolved in favor of the 
defendant. State v. Eaton, 569 P.2d 1114,1116 (Utah 1977).13 
In this case, as amply demonstrated above, the prosecutor misstated the law 
when she instructed the jury that Christensen's mental state was no defense to the 
charges. Not only is mental illness an affirmative defense to the charges, but there was so 
much persuasive evidence that Christensen was suffering from a mental illness at the time 
of the incident that even the trial court was persuaded "there was something wrong" 
(R155:205). Accordingly, the prosecutor's incorrect statement of the law called the jury's 
attention to matters it was not justified in considering during its deliberations. 
Further, Christensen was prejudiced by the prosecutor's improper statement 
because there was persuasive evidence that Christensen lacked the requisite mental state 
and because no other instruction regarding the affect of mental illness on a defendant's 
ability to form intent was given. 
Indeed, the only instruction the jury was given relative to this issue was the 
prosecutor's erroneous one. Given the City's own evidence that Christensen was 
13More recent opinions from the Utah Supreme Court have stated differing 
standards. See, e.g., State v. Hay, 859 P.2d 1, 7 (Utah 1993)(a defendant must show that 
the results would likely have been more favorable in the absence of the misconduct). 
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irrational, in medical shock and suffering from psychosis and hallucinations, the jury 
likely would have found that Christensen lacked the requisite intent to commit the crimes 
had they been properly instructed. Therefore, it is more than probable that the jury was 
improperly influenced by the prosecutor's statement, Christensen was prejudiced thereby 
and it was not harmless. 
B. Plain error. 
The trial court's failure to correct the prosecutor's statement was plain error. "To 
prevail under plain error review, a defendant must demonstrate three elements. First, he 
must establish that an error did in fact occur. Second, he must establish that the error 
should have been obvious to the trial court. Third, the defendant must establish that the 
error was harmful, i.e., that there is a reasonable likelihood that he would have enjoyed a 
more favorable outcome absent the error." State v. King, 2006 UT 3 (citations and 
quotations omitted). 
The fact that an error occurred is conclusively established by the law set forth 
above demonstrating that mental illness is a recognized statutory affirmative defense. 
This error not only should have been obvious to the trial court because it contradicted 
established law, but the trial court was persuaded that Christensen was suffering from a 
mental illness at the time of the incident (Rl 55:205). Therefore, this error should have 
been obvious to the trial court. 
Finally, Christensen has already argued that the jury was more than probably 
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influenced by the prosecutor's misconduct, particularly in light of the fact that there was 
no formal jury instruction on the issue and persuasive evidence to support a mental illness 
defense. Thus, the error was harmful. There is more than a reasonable likelihood that the 
outcome would have been more favorable to Christensen had the jury been properly 
instructed, particularly in light of the persuasive evidence that even the City presented of 
Christensen's mental illness. 
Based on the foregoing, the trial court's failure to correct the prosecutor's 
misconduct by properly instructing the jury was plain error. 
HI. CHRISTENSEN'S COUNSEL RENDERED INEFFECTIVE 
ASSISTANCE. 
Christensen's counsel rendered ineffective assistance (1) by failing to argue that 
Christensen's mental state at the time of the incident negated his intent and was, 
therefore, a complete affirmative defense to the charges, and (2) by failing to object to the 
prosecutor's incorrect statement of the law that mental state was no defense. 
It is Christensen's burden to show that his trial counsel rendered ineffective 
assistance such that trial counsel's performance fell below objectively reasonable 
standards of representation, and that this objectively deficient performance was 
prejudicial to Christensen. See e.g. Parsons v. Barnes, 871 P.2d 516, 521 (Utah), cert. 
denied 513 U.S. 966 (1994). 
The first prong of this standard requires Christensen to overcome the "strong 
presumption that counsel's performance fell 'within the wide range of reasonable 
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professional assistance' and that 'under the circumstances, the challenged action might be 
considered sound trial strategy."5 State v. Cosey, 873 P.2d 1177, 1179 (Utah App. 1994). 
The second or prejudice prong of the ineffective assistance of counsel doctrine requires 
proof of a reasonable probability of a different result in the absence of the objectively 
deficient performance. See e.g. State v. Lovell, 758 P.2d 909, 913 (Utah 1988); see also, 
Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419,434 (1994) (explaining that a "reasonable probability"of a 
different result is such that it "undermines confidence in the outcome of the trial" 
(citation omitted)). 
When there is no conceivable strategic basis for counsel's performance, 
objectively deficient performance is established. See, State v. Smith, 65 P.3d 648 (Utah 
Ct. App. 2003) (counsel's failure to request dismissal of a concealed weapons charge 
after State failed to produce evidence was ineffective assistance); State v. Gal legos, 967 
P.2d 973, 976 (Utah 1998) (trial counsel's failure to renew suppression motion 
constituted ineffective assistance of counsel); State v. Snyder, 860 P.2d 351 (Utah App. 
1993) (reversing two convictions for lewdness involving a child because trial counsel 
failed to timely file motion to suppress statements taken in violation of Miranda). 
As the United States Supreme Court explained in Strickland v. Washington, 466 
U.S. 668 (1984): 
[Strategic choices made after thorough investigation of law and facts 
relevant to plausible options are virtually unchallengeable; and strategic 
choices made after less than complete investigation are reasonable 
precisely to the extent that reasonable professional judgments support 
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the limitations on investigation. 
Id. at 690-91. In this case, the record establishes both objectively deficient performance 
and prejudice. 
A. Failure to raise mental illness defense. 
As previously noted, there was ample persuasive evidence - most notably from 
the City's own witnesses - that Christensen was hallucinating and suffering from an 
injury-induced or -enhanced mental illness when the incident occurred and that he lacked 
the requisite mental state as to each charge (Rl55:62, 100, 106, 109-10, 117-19, 124, 129, 
145, 147). Even the trial court was persuaded by the evidence that Christensen was 
suffering from a mental illness (Rl55:205). 
Because mental illness, particularly the type that would cause hallucinations, is a 
complete affirmative defense "under any statute or ordinance" if the evidence 
demonstrates that the defendant lacked a mental state that is an element of the offense 
(Utah Code Ann. §76-2-305 (l)(a)), there is no conceivable strategic basis for trial 
counsels' failure to raise it in this case. 
"Attorneys have an obligation to explore all readily available sources of 
evidence that might benefit their clients." Brown v. Sternes, 304 F.3d 677, 693-694 (7th 
Cir. 2002) (holding that counsel rendered ineffective assistance for failing to investigate 
and present evidence that the defendant suffered from schizophrenia "that caused him to 
hallucinate and suffer from delusions of paranoia"); see also, State v. Sessions, 645 P.2d 
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643, 645 (Utah 1982) (explaining that "the trier of fact should have the benefit of 
whatever evidence bears on the intent of a defendant when a specific intent or purpose is 
an element of the crime"). Thus, a trier of fact should be presented with evidence and be 
properly instructed when there is persuasive evidence that the defendant suffered from a 
mental illness that impaired his ability to form any intent, such as here. 
The evidence in this case was that Christensen was in shock, hallucinating, 
irrational, and psychotic (see supra). After a time, the evidence proves that these 
symptoms began to subside and Christensen gradually became more "rational" and calm 
R155:102, 119), strongly indicating that Christensen suffered from an injury-induced 
mental illness. The fact that Christensen was initially irrational, as the City's witnesses 
testified (R155:102:119), suggests that Christensen lacked the ability to reason when he 
arrived at the ER and for a significant period of time thereafter. It is difficult to conceive 
of a situation where a defendant would be less capable of forming criminal intent. In 
light of this evidence, there is no conceivable strategic basis for trial counsel's failure to 
raise this defense, and their failure to do so constitutes objectively deficient performance. 
Christensen must also show that but for counsels' error, there is a reasonable 
probability that the result would have been different. State v. Hallett, 856 P.2d 1060, 
1062 (Utah 1993) (citing State v. Verde, 170 P.2d 116, 118 (Utah 1989). Had counsel 
raised a mental illness defense pursuant to §76-2-305, the jury would have considered the 
persuasive evidence that Christensen was suffering from a mental illness and lacked the 
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mental state that was a necessary element to the offenses. Because that defense was not 
raised, the jury was left with the prosecutor's statement that Christensen's mental state 
was no defense to the charges. Thus, trial counsels' failure prejudiced Christensen. 
B. Failure to object to prosecutor's misstatement of law. 
Christensen's trial counsel was also ineffective for failing to object when the 
prosecutor told the jury that Christensen's mental state, including evidence that he was 
hallucinating, was no defense to the charges in this case (R155:197). 
As previously demonstrated, the prosecutor's statement was incorrect as a matter 
of law. An attorney's failure to understand the law constitutes objectively deficient 
performance. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. ay 690-91 (explaining that failure to 
investigate the facts and law constitutes objectively deficient performance). 
Christensen was prejudiced by his counsels' deficient performance because, as 
previously argued, there is more than a reasonable probability that the jury was influenced 
by the prosecutor's misstatement of the law, such that there is more than a reasonable 
probability of a different outcome had the error not been made. 
Accordingly, trial counsels' failure to object to the prosecutor's statement 
violated Christensen's Sixth Amendment right to counsel. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Christensen respectfully requests this Court to vacate 
his convictions. 
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